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Abstract
We identify the impact of transparency in political decision-making on the quality of political
representation with a difference-in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation
is measured by the observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter
preferences on identical issues.We show that full transparency of votes of individual politicians
does not decrease divergence from voter preferences.
Keywords:Transparency, quality of political decisions, representation, parliament, individual
votes, referenda.
INTRODUCTION
Transparency in political decision-making is often proposed as a remedy to failures
of the political agency. Transparent individual decisions are thought to foster
accountability and align the interests of politicians/agents with voters/principals.
Many countries have implementedopen government reforms (Carey 2008) and grant
public access to recorded individual votes, i.e. votes with the names of politicians
voting for and against a proposal.
However, a small number of recent theoretical contributions (e.g. Fox 2007; Prat
2005) discuss potential negative consequences of transparency in political decision-
making on the quality of policy outcomes and representation of voter preferences,
particularly when actions of politicians such as individual votes are recorded and
made publicly available. Empirical evidence of the causal effects of full transparency
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on political decision-making is currently scarce at best. Therefore, the present paper
attempts to fill this gap using an especially informative natural setting.
Voters in Switzerland reveal their policy preferences in referenda. Parlia-
mentarians vote on identical policy issues as voters in referenda. Thus, we can
directly confront referendum results with parliamentary decisions in the Lower and
UpperHouse of the Swiss Parliament to obtain a directmeasure of divergence, i.e. an
inversemeasure for the quality of politicians’ decisionswith respect to revealed voter
preferences. Since the winter session of 2006, publicly available video streams of the
Upper House’s sessions allow identifying votes of individual politicians, instead
of only aggregate decisions prior to 2006. In the Lower House, final individual
votes of politicians have been recorded electronically and published before and
after the year 2006. Thus, we exploit a difference-in-difference setting to identify
the effect of increased transparency of individual votes on the quality of political
decisions with respect to voter preferences. Empirical results indicate that making
it easier to identify individual votes and actions of politicians does not necessarily
improve the quality of representation in terms of aligning political decisions and
voter preferences more closely.
We present the empirical identification strategy in Section 2, assess the causal
effect of transparency on the quality of political representation in Section 3, and
conclude in Section 4.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We exploit a unique quasi-natural institutional setting in Switzerland to identify the
effect of transparency of politicians’ votes in Parliament on the quality of political
decisions with respect to voter preferences.
Two houses, the Lower House (National Council/Nationalrat) and the Upper
House (Council of States/Sta¨nderat) make up the Swiss Parliament. Both houses
have the same amount of political power and decide on the same legislative and
constitutional amendments. Parliamentary proposals have to be approved by the
majority of members in each house in order to be adopted. Members of the Lower
House are elected under a system of proportional representation with open party
lists and the members of the Upper House are elected by plurality rule.1 The
aggregated results of the final policy decisions of both houses are published.
In an effort toward open government reforms, video streams of the parliamentary
sessions have beenmade publicly available on the internet since the winter session of
2006. Thus, both the discussion and individual final votes of members of the Upper
House can be identified as politicians vote by raising their hands. Before 2006,
1This institutional difference between the houses remained stable over time and, thus, plays no role for
our identification strategy, as will become apparent.
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identifying individual votes in the Upper House after the session was impossible.
Importantly, parliamentarians did not decide themselves on the publication of the
recordings but neither did they impede the Parliamentary Services from releasing
them. Greater transparency in the Upper House was constantly demanded by
different proponents, including certain party officials, the media, and other groups.2
The individual final votes of politicians in the Lower House have been recorded
electronically and have been made publicly available since 1995.
The legislative and constitutional proposals of Parliament are not directly
enacted. Before proposals are enacted, Swiss voters are given the opportunity
to demand a referendum and they can propose constitutional amendments by
initiatives (Frey 1994; Portmann et al., 2012).3 Referendum results reflect voter
preferences with regard to constitutional and legislative proposals (Schneider et al.,
1981). Voters and parliamentarians decide on identical proposals with exactly the
same wording. Thus, the parliamentary decisions can be matched and directly
compared with revealed voter preferences in referenda (Carey andHix 2013; Hersch
and McDougall 1988; Matsusaka 2010).
We take the absolute difference between the voter yes-share in a referendum and
the yes-share of politicians in their parliamentary decisions in the respective house
as a natural and inverse measure of the quality of political decisions, i.e. we observe
divergence from voter preferences in the two houses. The absolute difference to
the voter yes-share of each house represents a meaningful measure of preference
representation (Golder and Stramski 2010). Different levels of divergence for the
two houses are due to the electoral system, which remained unchanged over the
period analyzed, and thus makes the Lower House a control group for the Upper
House, where transparency of individual decisions changed. Divergence from voter
preferences is associated with adverse consequences, particularly in relation to
candidates’ election prospects (Stadelmann et al., 2013b).
Similar to other countries, Swiss parliamentarians rely on common tools (e.g.
surveys, personal experience, etc.) to infer voter preferences as they are only revealed
after parliamentary decisions which is essential when evaluating legislative shirking
(Garret 1999). Therefore, our results are likely to generalize to decisions in countries
where policy preferences of voters are not directly observable from referendum
results.
Our dataset consists of 91 referenda that cover a broad range of different topics.
The corresponding, identical parliamentary decisions of each of the two houses
2Evaluations of final individual votes of the Upper House were a topic ahead of the 2011 elections (e.g.
NZZ am Sonntag, No. 35, 28.08.2011, p. 15) and after reports of miscounting of votes in the Upper
House, analyses of the recordings were prominently discussed.
3By collecting 50,000 signatures, any legislative amendment may be subject to a referendum. For
constitutional amendments, referenda are mandatory. 100,000 are sufficient for an initiative and
politicians are required to vote on initiatives. Stadelmann et al. (2013a) provide further details on
the institutional background.
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Figure 1
The Effect of Full Transparency of Individual Votes on the Divergence of Politicians From
Voter Preferences
took place during the three legislatures (46th, 47th, 48th) from 1999 to 2011, leading
to a total of 182 observations. The data are available from the Swiss Parliamentary
Services.
The identification strategy follows directly from the institutional setting under
examination: For the entire period of analysis, we observe actual divergence from
revealed voter preferences of the Lower and the Upper House. From 2006 onwards
(during the third year of the 47th legislature, over a year prior to elections), the
individual votes of members of the Upper House were made transparent by the
introduction of video streams. Individual votes in the Lower House were made
public throughout the period of analysis. Thus, we employ a standard difference-
in-difference strategy to identify the causal impact of increased transparency on the
quality of political decisions with respect to voter preferences.
RESULTS
Figure 1 and its accompanying Table 1 convey the central effect of increased
transparency on divergence from voter preferences. Before the public availability
of video streams (prior to the winter session of 2006), the average divergence from
voter preferences was 15.4%-points in the Lower House and 27.9%-points in the
Upper House. After the public availability of video streams, the average divergence
was 14.7%-points in the Lower House and 26.9%-points in the Upper House. Thus,
the reduction in divergence corresponds to 0.7%-points for the Lower and 1.0%-
points for the Upper House. The difference-in-difference identifies the causal effect
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Table 1
Descriptive Results—The Effect of Full Transparency on the Divergence From
Voter Preferences
Before availability After public availability
of video streams of video streams Difference
Divergence from voter 0.154∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ −0.007
preferences of Lower House (0.016) (0.025) (0.030)
Divergence from voter 0.279∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ −0.010
preferences of Upper House (0.019) (0.027) (0.033)
0.125∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ −0.003
Difference
(0.025) (0.037) (0.045)
Notes: ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance levels of below 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.
of the increase in transparency which corresponds to a meager and insignificant
0.3%-points lower divergence. These results do not provide systematic support to
the common claims that increased transparency generally improves the quality of
political representation.
Table 2, specification (1) confirms the baseline results from Figure 1 with a
dummy for the Upper House, a dummy indicating the public availability of video
streams, and an interaction between the two to identify the effect of increased
transparency. Specification (2) shows that even in the short term (i.e. the 30 matched
parliamentary/referenda decisions made directly before and after the introduction
of full transparency) no significant impact due to transparency is observed, and the
point estimate of the interaction effect turns positive.4
Transparency in political decisions may be particularly important when conflicts
of interest arise. Therefore, we focus on a subsample where business associations
and trade unions issue different voting recommendations. However, we still do
not observe any significant impact due to the existence of public video stream
availability (specification 3). Similarly, when left and right political parties issue
different recommendations (specification 4), greater transparency does not play any
significant role in decreasing divergence either.5
Making the decision processes in politics more transparent may have its
disadvantages when voters have priors for controversial issues. Initiatives are usually
more controversial than proposals brought forward by Parliament. In specification
(5), which focuses on initiatives only, we find a positive but not significant difference-
in-difference effect. The importance of a policy issue in a referendum is partly
4When reducing the set to the 47th legislature (when video streams were made public) the interaction
effect is also positive and not significant. When including the full 45th legislature and first results for the
current 49th legislature, the effect of more transparency remains insignificant.
5We employ official recommendations of the largest Swiss Business Federation “economiesuisse” and
the “Federation of Swiss Trade Unions” (specification 3) as well as the Swiss People’s Party and the
Social Democrats (specification 4) as recorded by the Parliamentary Services.
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Table 2
Difference-in-Difference—Full Transparency of Individual Votes Due to Video Stream Availability Does Not Reduce Divergence of Politicians
From Voter Preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full 30 referenda Conflict business Conflict left Initiatives High turnout Full
sample before/after vs. unions vs. right only referenda sample
Upper House 0.1257∗∗∗ 0.1317∗∗∗ 0.1213∗∗∗ 0.1371∗∗∗ 0.1037∗∗∗ 0.1178∗∗∗ 0.1257∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0329) (0.0319) (0.0287) (0.0260) (0.0400) (0.0227)
Video publicly available −0.0072 0.0298 0.0275 −0.0163 −0.0079 −0.0594 0.0039
(0.0297) (0.0389) (0.0482) (0.0311) (0.0347) (0.0406) (0.0287)
(Upper House) ∗ (Video Publicly Available) −0.0032 0.0073 0.0050 −0.0225 0.0018 0.0346 −0.0032
(0.0442) (0.0567) (0.0744) (0.0471) (0.0503) (0.0622) (0.0414)
Turnout in referendum 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0014)
Is initiative −0.1061∗∗∗
(0.0199)
Conflict between left and right parties −0.0085
(0.0288)
Intercept 0.1537∗∗∗ 0.1148∗∗∗ 0.1367∗∗∗ 0.1525∗∗∗ 0.1134∗∗∗ 0.1681∗∗∗ 0.0049
(0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0210) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0269) (0.0591)
R2 0.166 0.287 0.148 0.179 0.193 0.177 0.291
No. of observations 182 60 106 154 84 88 182
Notes: The dependent variable for all estimations is “Divergence from voter preferences”. Robust standard errors are reported throughout the table. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance levels of below 1%, between
1% and 5%, and between 5% and 10%, respectively.
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22 Transparency and Political Representation
reflected by turnout. Specification (6) considers a subset of referenda which received
a relatively high turnout. While we do not find any significant effect of increased
transparency, the point estimate is with 3.5%-points relatively large and again
positive which suggests, if anything, higher divergence for potentially controversial
proposal due to transparency.
Finally, specification (7) looks at the full sample and includes additional control
variables. Again, we do not find any significant interaction effect of video availability
on divergence of politicians from voter preferences.
CONCLUSIONS
Pundits of fully transparent political processes suggest that transparency fosters
greater accountability of politicians towards their voters.We exploit a natural setting
to test this claim and analyze the effect of transparency of political processes on the
quality of political decisions. We use the observed divergence of politicians from
voter preferences as an inverse and direct measure of quality. The introduction of
publicly available video streams of the debates and votes of the Swiss Parliament
in 2006 allows identifying individual votes of politicians in the Upper House. Final
individual votes have been published before and after 2006 for the Lower House
of Parliament. Thus, we use a difference-in-difference setting to identify the causal
effect of transparency on divergence from voter preferences.
Empirical results show that full transparency does not necessarily increase the
quality of political representation in the Upper House compared to the Lower
House. The point estimates of the impact of increased transparency of individual
actions on divergence from voter preferences are sometimes even positive. Thus,
there is no clear support for the common belief that transparency always increases
accountability. We highlight, however, that the way transparency was achieved,
may not prove powerful enough to change the behavior of politicians towards
voters. While, in principle, all decisions were transparent after 2006 and could be
analyzed ex-post, gathering information from videos might represent an obstacle
to the simple and fast dissemination into political debates. Nevertheless, politicians
might be expected to adapt their behavior towards voters given that they can be
evaluated prior to elections. We recognize that we cannot provide direct evidence on
the power of the change in transparency such that there remains the potential that
the increase in transparency was too weak to affect the quality of representation.
However, our results may generalize to countries where greater transparency is
publicly declared but relevant information for voters is not easily available.
While our empirical results seem unexpected, they are generally consistent with
predictions of recent and elaborated models (Fox 2007; Prat 2005) which highlight
the potential negative impacts of transparency of individual votes on the quality of
political representation. Studies from other areas where video streams/surveillance
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was introduced also cast doubt on the effectiveness of such measures (see Stutzer
and Zehnder 2013 for a review of video surveillance).
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